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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
BE'TH F. DRURY, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
CASE vs. 
( NO. 10466 
COLLEEN LUNCEFORD, 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Respondent agrees with appellant's statement of the 
n<.:turc of the case. 
DISPOSmON IN LOWER COURT 
RPspondent agrees with the appellant's statement as to 
th2 disposition of the case in the lower court, except re-
spond,'nt contends that the trial court at the conclusion 
ol the C\ idence expressed the view that the judgment should 
1 " ~;2 000.00 plus the special damages, and that the only 
iudg1m,n1 granted was· the judgment signed by the court 
't1'i Ucc! March 8, 1965. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the statement of f . ads~· 
forth by app2llant, except respondent contends th t · '' a JUdg 
ment was never awarded for $2,000.00 plus sp2cial da!'ij. 
ages of $126.20, but that there was only an exp""' · 
'""SSIO!l Of 
opinion by the court as to this fact. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECON-
SIDERING THE LAW AND THE FACTS BEFORE EN-
TERING JUDGMENT. 
After the parties had presented evidence in the effort 
to support their respective contentions and after the par-
ties had completed argument to the Court, the Trial Judge 
orally stated afteT considering the matter ten minutes, "I 
think in view of the injuries, the judgment of $2,000.00 
would be fair, plus the special damages orf One Hw1dred 
and 'I\venty-six Dollars and Twenty Cents." (Tr. 37). The 
Court thereafter, after fully considering the matter, issue<J 
what is called a Reconsideration stating, " ... that plain· 
tiff is entitled to recorver the sum of $4,800.00 general dam· 
ages, plus special damages of $126.20, and costs." The 
Court, on March 8, 1965, entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Judgment. The Utah Supreme 
Court, in the case of McCoilum vs. Clothier, 121 U. 311. 
241 P.2d 468, states, "No antecedent expression of the 
trial judge can in any way restrict his absolute power to 
declare his final conclusion in the only manner authorized 
by law. to wit, by filing his decision, findings of fact, and 
3 
, .w:lu::;ions of law." Two later Utah cases have cited Mc-
collum vs. Clothier, and have applied this principle. See 
.Tohn c. Powers vs. Marvin F. Taylor, 14 U.2d 118, 378 P.2d 
519. and Benner J. Carling vs. Industrial Commission of 
Utah and Consolidated Western Steel Division, United 
States Steel Corporation, 16 U.2d 260, 399 P.2d 202; also 
see Phillips vs. Hooper, 111 P.2d 22, and Ritter vs. John-
son. 300 P. 518. 
POINT II 
11-IE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SETTING 
.-1SIDE ITS UNCONDITIONAL ORDER GRANTING D& 
FTNDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Appellant in this matter contends that, ". . . it was 
an irregularity in the proceedings in the action of the trial 
judge announcing his oral decision from the bench on the 
day of the trial and then two days later, on his own mottoo, 
after having mulled the evidence over in his mind, and 
reeonsidered the evidence and issues having increased the 
general damages awarded .... " See appellant's brief, 
Point IL Appellant, however, in the lower court did not 
support her motion by an affidavit as required by Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(c). 
The lower court specifically foond that there was not 
':anse for a new trial as provided under Rule 59. The 
trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial absent a 
'~owing of one of the grounds specified in Rule 59. See 
Tangaro vs. Manero, 13 U.2d 290, 373 P.2d 390. 
RE>spondent admits that an order denying a new trial 
i'' final in character and operates to terminate the trial 
'
1=urt's jurisdiction. An order granting a new trial is dif-
4 
ferent in character than an order denying one Th 
• · e ordf• 
denymg a new trial terminates the cause while . . · ' · an Order 
granting a new trial operates to vacate the J'udgm t : en an~ 
reinstate the case as one undisposed of before th · e court 
over which it retains jurisdiction. See Bateman vs. Don~ 
van, 131 F.2d 759. The Bateman vs. Donovan case was 
cited by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Nationa; 
Farmer's Union Property and Casualty Company vs. u,. 
land J. Thompson, 4 U.2d 7, 286 P.2d 249, wherein the 
Court approved the setting aside of a conditional order 
granting a new trial. 
POINT III 
THE DAMAGES GRANTED BY THE LOWER 
COURT WERE NOT EXCESSIVE. 
An action for injury to one's person because of the 
negligent act of another is an action at law. CJS, Negli· 
gence, Vol. 65, Sec. 174, p. 854. Since the action is at law. 
the Supreme Court may not alter the District Court's rul· 
ing if there is substantial evidence to support the trial 
court's findings. Wilson vs. Salt Lake City, 174 P. 847 
See Appeal and Error, Key No. 1011 (1). 
In this case, Nephi K. Kezerian, M.D., testified that 
the plaintiff, Beth F. Drury, had experienced a flexion e\ 
tension sprain and strain of the neck with suggested loc~i­
ization in posterior inter spinus ligament, C5-6, (Tr. 14. 
Line 9-11), and that it was his opinion that there is a rea· 
sonable medical probability that the patient did have a 
stretch injury as to constitute at least an incomplete tear 
of the ligament between the posterior spine process of the 
C 5 and C 6, reasonably dating to the described injury or 
5 
April 1, 1964. (Tr. 15, Lines 1-6), and that she had re-
"''i\·ej a permanent loss of total bodily function incident 
to the injury described of 5%, (Tr. 15, Lines 15-19). The 
-;um of $4,800.00 would hardly be excessive for such an in-
Jtll'y. See Agnew vs. Cox, 254 F.2d 263. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that in tJhe lower 
C'CJUrt plaintiff's action was an action at law and that the 
trial court's findings are supported by evidence and in fact 
were based upon the preponderance of evidence, and tJhe 
t1ial court did not err in the procedural steps leading to 
the judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY H. IVIE 
Attorney for Respondent 
48 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
